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Why Hold Elections? Using Consent
Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political
Change
Michael W. McConnellt
Lawmakers always have dreamed of making their decisions ir-
revocable. Ancient lawgivers pronounced a curse on future genera-
tions who might presume to alter their enactments. Modern politi-
cians hope to set in train such powerful political forces that
successors will not be able to change direction. Here in Chicago, a
faction of the City Council recently attempted to guarantee against
prospective electoral defeat by voting (by simple majority) to re-
quire a two-thirds vote in the future to dislodge themselves from
Council leadership posts or to change key provisions in the Council
rules.1
But statutes, however wise, can be repealed by later legisla-
tures,2 executive orders can be modified by successor Presidents,3
and council rules adopted by a majority can be repealed by future
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. The author partici-
pated as counsel in several of the cases discussed herein: Roti v. Washington, United States
v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gor-
such, and Mabry v. Johnson. Many thanks are due to Paul Bator, Frank Easterbrook, Rich-
ard Epstein, Larry Kramer, Douglas Laycock, Geoffrey Miller, Richard Stewart, and David
Strauss for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
See Roti v. Washington, 148 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1007-08, 500 N.E.2d 463, 464-65 (Ill.
App. 1986).
2 For a self-conscious example, see Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
in Virginia:
And though we well know that this Assembly. .. have no power to restrain the
acts of succeeding Assemblies, constituted with powers equal to our own, and that
therefore to declare this act irrevocable would be of no effect in law; yet we are
free to declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural
rights of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the pre-
sent or to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement of natural right.
Julian'P. Boyd, ed., 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 546-47 (1950). See generally Geoffrey
Marshall, Constitutional Theory 41-57 (1971) (discussing problem of "entrenchment" under
British constitutional system).
3 Consider, for example, the controversy over suggestions that the President amend or
revoke Executive Order 11246 (Sept. 24, 1965), which establishes affirmative action require-
ments for contractors doing business with the federal government. Cong. Q. Weekly Rep.
2106-07 (Oct. 19, 1985). No one, to my knowledge, has suggested that the President lacks
this power.
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majorities.4 Even the Constitution can be amended by vote of the
same percentage of states originally required to ratify it.5 Future
lawmakers have just as much power to depart from the decisions of
their forebears as their forebears had to make the decisions in the
first place.
Unless, we are now told, the decisions have been embodied in
consent decrees.
Consent decrees are a form of settlement in which the parties
agree to end the litigation in return for a promise that one (or
both) of them will change their conduct for a specified period of
time, sometimes indefinitely. They are entered as a judgment of
the court and are enforceable in the same way as court injunctions;
yet they contain no determination by the court either that the
party thus bound had violated the law or that the relief thus
granted was legally warranted. Of concern here are consent decrees
between government lawyers and a private party, in which the pri-
vate party agrees to cease litigation (as either plaintiff or defend-
ant) on agreed terms, in exchange for a commitment by the gov-
ernment that executive discretion will in the future be exercised in
a particular way.
Consent decrees have not traditionally been considered a tool
of governmental policy making. Statutes, executive orders, regula-
tions, adjudications, and policy statements have heretofore been
the means by which governmental policy is given the force and ef-
fect of law.' Recent federal court decisions-especially United
States v. Board of Education of City of Chicago7 and Citizens for
4 Roti v. Washington, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1012, 500 N.E.2d at 467, quoting State ex rel.
Kiel v. Riechmann, 239 Mo. 81, 97-98, 142 S.W. 304, 309 (Mo. 1911) ("The same power
which can make rules in the first instance can directly attack and unmake or repeal such
rules.").
" U.S. Const. art. V; compare id. art. VII. One provision of the Constitution purportedly
cannot be repealed: the "equal Suffrage" of each State in the Senate. U.S. Const. art. V.
This is a deeply paradoxical limitation; nothing in the text indicates that this limitation
cannot itself be amended by ordinary action.
I In perusing the leading casebooks on administrative and legislative process, I have
found none in which consent decrees were mentioned either in an index or a table of
contents.
554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (approving consent decree); 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D.
IM. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding United States
in violation of decree); 567 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (upholding constitutionality of the
desegregation plan); 588 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (on remand, holding United States in
violation of decree, requiring Administration to lobby for additional funds, and quantifying




a Better Environment v. Gorsuch8-have, however, created a new
species of lawmaking. The courts in these cases held, in effect, that
executive officials in one Administration can set policy today and
bind their successors to comply with it tomorrow, by settling a law-
suit on those terms. This development forces us to look at consent
decrees in a new light.
Professor Peter Shane has made a major contribution by offer-
ing the first comprehensive analysis of "discretion-limiting" con-
sent decrees in the context of the Constitution's allocation of law-
making authority.' While recognizing that consent decrees can go
beyond constitutional bounds by interfering with constitutionally-
vested executive discretion, Professor Shane's central message is
that there is no cause for alarm: consent decrees, even in cases like
Chicago Board of Education and Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, fall within the flexible tradition of American administrative
and constitutional law. The anxiety over consent decrees, he sug-
gests, reflects little more than a general anxiety over increasing ju-
dicial oversight of executive functions.
I disagree. Whatever may be the state of executive-judicial re-
lations generally, consent decrees like those emerging from these
cases are a unique and unacceptable development. To the extent
that consent decrees insulate today's policy decisions from review
and modification by tomorrow's political processes, they violate the
democratic structure of government. They should be repudiated
before they become a common part of the legal landscape.
I. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CONSENT DECREES
A. The Distinctive Character of Consent Decrees
Why do consent decrees against the government pose a special
problem for constitutional and administrative law? Most consent
decrees are ordinary compromises of litigation, controversial only
insofar as the legal claims underlying them may be controversial.
As a means for resolving legal disputes without wasteful litigation,
consent decrees are unexceptional, indeed indispensable tools, for
the intelligent conduct of government litigation. To be sure, con-
sent decrees frequently require the executive to surrender a por-
tion of its authority to the courts; this raises the usual set of
problems of reconciling aggressive judicial supervision of executive
8 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
9 Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency
and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 241.
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performance with the structural principles set out in the Constitu-
tion.'0 But consent decrees are not unique in this regard. Injunc-
tions, declaratory judgments, and legislative schemes inviting an
active judicial role all raise the same set of problems. Is there any
sense in which government consent decrees should excite more
than the usual anxiety over the transfer of policy-making discre-
tion from Presidents to judges?
I contend that a narrow but important class of consent de-
crees, if judicially enforced, would violate the structural provisions
of the Constitution by denying future executive officials the policy-
making authority vested in them by the Constitution and laws.
These consent decrees circumvent democratic change by preclud-
ing subsequent Presidents from changing policies set, through con-
sent decree, by a previous Administration (or, for that matter, by
preventing a single President from changing his mind). Further-
more, especially at the state and local level, consent decrees can
enable officials to transgress limits on their authority or sidestep
political checks and balances.
For example, an opponent of affirmative action might sue the
Secretary of Labor, contending that Executive Order 11246, which
establishes goals and timetables for the hiring of black construc-
tion workers in federally-funded construction projects, is unconsti-
tutional. (I presume, for purposes of this hypothetical, that there is
no legal obstacle that would prevent the President from revoking
the Executive Order, but also that there is no judicially-accepted
principle of constitutional law that would persuade a court to
strike down the Order.) Could executive branch lawyers settle the
lawsuit by entering a consent decree rescinding the Executive Or-
der and promising that it would never be reinstated? In the face of
such a decree, could a future President who supports affirmative
racial preferences reissue the Executive Order?
Under current law, a proposed consent decree may be entered
as a judgment of the court without any independent determination
by the court that it is warranted under the facts or law pertinent
to the case." Moreover, the current rules regarding enforcement
10 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (assigning to the President the responsibility to "take
Care that the laws be faithfully executed"); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the
Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1978). Defenders of the new
model of public law do not deny that it has been a major departure from the traditional
understanding of judicial and executive roles. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1669-70 (1975); Shane, 1987 U. Chi.
Legal F. at 284-86 (cited in note 9).
" Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3077-78 (1986). See also note
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and modification of consent decrees bind future government offi-
cials, unless the private party to the decree agrees to a modifica-
tion or the officials are able to persuade the ,court that enforcement
of the decree would result in a "grievous wrong."' 2 That voters
may have elected government officials with different views about
appropriate public policy does not, presumably, constitute a wrong
sufficiently "grievous" to meet this test.13
Surely there is something troubling about such a decree. I do
not doubt that the President has the authority to revoke an execu-
tive order in response to a lawsuit. It is much harder to accept his
authority to bargain away the right of his successors to adopt a
different policy. Consent decrees of this sort differ fundamentally
from other forms of governmental policy making: they expressly
limit future political discretion. 4
To be sure, today's policy inevitably has repercussions for to-
morrow. It is harder for future policymakers to reverse course than
it is to chart a policy in new areas. But the general rule for demo-
cratic bodies is that the same authority that has power to adopt a
legal rule has authority to change it. By contrast, if government
policy is set by consent decree, then future executive officials can-
not abrogate the decree on their own authority. 15 They would have
to obtain the consent of an outside party (the other party to the
decree or a judge). Unlike other forms of government policy mak-
ing, consent decrees, in Professor Shane's apt words, make ordina-
32.
12 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). Professor Shane apparently
endorses a more relaxed standard for modifying consent decrees that limit government dis-
cretion. Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 269 n.105. (cited in note 9). This seems to be the
emerging consensus among courts of appeals. See Philadelphia Welfare Rights Organization
v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120 (3d Cir. 1979) (endorsing flexible approach to modifications of
affirmative injunctions governing the conduct of government programs); New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 970 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); Alliance to
End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1020 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (same).
,1 See Citizens for a Better Environment, 718 F.2d at 1128; compare id. at 1134
(Wilkey. J., dissenting). See also Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent De-
crees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 327,
341-48.
," This problem may be compared to that discussed by Professor Douglas Laycock in
Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U.
Chi. Legal F. 103. In his article, Professor Laycock discusses the effect of consent decrees on
third parties unrepresented in the litigation. Here, the unrepresented "third parties" are
future executive officials, and ultimately the people who elect them.
11 Unless, of course, they follow Professor Shane's wise counsel and incorporate in every
"discretion-limiting" consent decree language permitting future modification. See Shane,
1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 261, 265 (cited in note 9). I agree that his suggested "guidelines"
would be more effectual than current Justice Department guidelines. See id. at 265, 279-84.
295]
300 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
rily "revisable" discretion "nonrevisable.' 16 That is, they insulate
the policies embodied in the decree from future political change,
and thus from the democratic process.17
B. The Standards for Judging the Constitutionality of Consent
Decrees
Article II of the Constitution vests significant discretionary
authority in the President, and through him in subordinate execu-
tive officers. By "the President" the Constitution of course means
the incumbent; the powers of the office cannot be exercised by for-
mer holders of the office. The Constitution explicitly provides that
Presidents shall serve four-year terms of office, for a maximum of
two terms. 8 At the end of his term, the authority of a President
and his Administration comes to an end. Any attempt by a Presi-
dent to exert legal control over the powers of his successors, unless
specifically authorized, is a violation of these constitutional
provisions.
The textual allocation of powers to a President of limited term
is fundamental to democratic accountability. When voters elect a
new President, they expect that he will have authority to change
those policies that, under the Constitution and laws, are left to the
discretion of the executive. The conduct of the executive branch,
no less than the legislative, is intended to be politically accounta-
ble. That is why we hold elections for President. If changes in pol-
icy have already been ruled out by binding and irrevocable agree-
ments with private parties, then there is no point in holding
them."
The question is not solely whether Congress has passed legis-
lation-such as the act authorizing the Attorney General to settle
16 Id. at 244.
I reject Professor Shane's suggestion, id. at 264, that discretion-limiting consent de-
crees are analogous to agency regulations binding the agency to rule-making procedures that
go beyond statutory minima. See also Percival, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 344-46 (cited in note
13). Future agency heads are free to revoke those regulations. By contrast, if the same pro-
cedures were embodied in a consent decree, future agency heads would be unable to change
them without permission from private parties or the court.
18 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; id. amend. XXII, § 1.
" Thus, the crux of my disagreement with Professor Shane is his conception that the
electoral accountability of the presidency is not an important feature of our constitutional
system. See Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 291 (cited in note 9) ("The reason we can
plausibly claim to have a politically accountable government with respect to domestic regu-
latory policy is not, for the most part, because we may vote for the President, but rather
because we vote for Congress.").
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litigation 20-that could be construed to provide authority to enter
discretion-limiting consent decrees of the sort described here. 1
Even if Congress were to pass a statute in so many words ("the
Attorney General is hereby authorized to enter into consent agree-
ments with private parties that limit the constitutional discretion
of future Presidents, and the courts shall enforce such decrees"), it
would be unconstitutional in many of its applications. Not even
Congress has the power to diminish the constitutional authority of
future Presidents.
Nor is the question solely one of "good faith" or proper use of
discretion. To be sure, one of the evils to be guarded against is the
collusive settlement-government lawyers settling a suit on
favorable terms to the opposing party precisely because they ex-
pect that successive administrations may be less sympathetic to its
cause. 2  But even in the absence of collusion, current officeholders
might well view the present concessions of the opponent as more
important than the future policy-making discretion of unknown
successors. The constitutional issue is not whether those who bar-
gained away executive authority decided wisely, but whether they
had the authority to bargain with that currency at all.
The enforceability of a consent decree follows logically from
its nature as a hybrid between a litigated judgment and a con-
tract.2" A consent decree cannot have any greater weight than the
combined authority of the parties who consent and the court that
enters the judgment .2  There are, therefore, two alternative bases
for upholding and requiring specific performance of a discretion-
limiting consent decree.
1. The Relief Contained in the Consent Decree Could Have
Been Ordered by the Court if the Case Had Proceeded to Judg-
20 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (1982).
21 See Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 255, 261-65 (cited in note 9).
22 One of the cases discussed by Professor Shane, id. at 251-53, involved an agreement
signed in 1979 that purported to freeze the rules governing mortgage foreclosure relief for
five years. Ferrell v. Pierce, 743 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1984). It may not have been a coincidence
that Carter Administration appointees toward the end of that administration chose a period
of time lasting roughly to the end of the succeeding administration. Compare Dunn v. Ca-
rey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1986) ("A court must be alert to the possibility that the
consent decree is a ploy in some other struggle.... The federal litigation may have offered
an opportunity to achieve other goals, and the 'consent'... may have been what defendants
received in exchange for giving plaintiffs what they wanted.").
21 Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3074; United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10 (1975); Kasper v. Board of Election Commissioners, Nos. 87-1125 and
87-1126, slip op. at 10 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instru-
ment of Compromise and Settlement, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1316-17 (1959).
24 See generally Laycock, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 103, 104 (cited in note 14).
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ment. If a lawsuit goes to judgment, the court may have authority
to issue an order requiring the executive to comply with legal re-
quirements, and defining the nature of the executive's legal obliga-
tions. If government lawyers, in an exercise of professional discre-
tion, decide to compromise on similar terms, this poses no more
constitutional problem than would a similar litigated decree.25 On
the other hand, to the extent that a consent decree contains ele-
ments that differ from or go beyond what a court could order in a
litigated judgment, it has no more force than any other agreement
between a government official and a private party. It gains no au-
thority by virtue of being filed with the court. Judicially-imposed
limitations on executive authority derive from law-that is, from
the Constitution, statute, or unrevoked regulation or executive or-
der.26 The troublesome character of consent decrees is that they
purport to make legally enforceable against future officeholders a
requirement or limitation that has not been imposed by law.
Of course, it is not always possible to determine, without the
benefit of trial, what relief a court would be authorized to enter
against the government. In some cases, it is far from a perfunctory
task for a subsequent court, asked to order specific performance of
a consent decree, to determine whether it is enforceable on this
basis. In other cases-important cases-the conclusion is painfully
obvious. I will discuss the practical problems of making this deter-
mination below. Suffice it to say that if no judicial authority for
the terms of a consent decree can reasonably be inferred, it cannot
215 This is not to say that such decrees, like litigated judgments, may not raise constitu-
tional problems of other sorts. The law underlying the decrees may be unconstitu-
tional-indeed, it may be unconstitutional precisely because it delegates excessive lawmak-
ing or executive supervisory authority to the courts. See, for example, Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1004-06 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from summary affirmance)
(questioning the constitutionality of statute allowing courts to override executive decisions
on the basis of their own "public interest" determination). But these problems are the
problems of modern public law generally, not peculiar to consent decrees. See generally
Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 255-61 (cited in note 9).
26 See System Federation v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961) ("the District Court's
authority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute which the decree is in-
tended to enforce"). This presumes an understanding of the judicial role under which reme-
dies are deducible from violations, a proposition which is now controversial. See generally
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 47 (1979). If the judicial role is seen, instead, as the development and
articulation of public values (Chayes, 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 1295-96; Fiss, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at
18) the consent decree becomes problematical on a different ground: that it subjects a public
function to private agreement. See Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. Chi. Legal
F. 1, 12-17.
27 See text at notes 37-40.
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serve as a basis for limiting the legally-vested discretion of future
executive officials.
2. The Commitment Must be Within the Authority of the
Government Signatory, Unaided by the Power of the Court. If a
given provision of a consent decree is beyond the court's remedial
authority, it must be based on consent. Thus, the decree can be
enforceable only if the government signatory has authority to give
his consent-that is, authority from some source, other than the
litigation, to bind the discretion of present and future
officeholders.28
There are specific contexts in which government officials can
take actions that restrict the legal discretion of their successors.
Some of these, like the President's pardon power29 or the Con-
gress's power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, 0
are expressly authorized by the Constitution. A President can par-
don a person of a suspected crime, and no future President can
prosecute him for it. One Congress can borrow money on the credit
of the United States, and a later Congress is obligated to pay it
back. Other putative powers of government officials to bind their
successors are more problematic.31 This is not the occasion for cat-
aloging or justifying circumstances when the Constitution permits
executive decisions that bind future legal discretion. Such in-
stances are rare. But if an executive official can bind the discretion
of his successors by unilateral action, there is no reason why he
cannot do the same by way of settling a lawsuit.3 2 Conversely, if
the official lacks the authority to bind the discretion of his succes-
28 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi.
Legal F. 19, 32-41.
11 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. This is Professor Shane's example. See Shane, 1987 U. Chi.
Legal F. at 244, 256 (cited in note 9).
30 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; id. amend. XIV, § 4. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330,
351, 353-54 (1935).
31 It is unsettled, for example, whether a President can invoke executive privilege for
documents prepared under his Administration, as against the decision of subsequent Presi-
dents to release them. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 446-51
(1977); id. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring).
2 My position is thus fully consistent with Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077-78
(holding that consent decrees are not unlawful merely because a court would lack the power
to impose the provisions as a remedy after trial). In the Local Number 93 situation, the
employer could have adopted an affirmative action plan as a matter of private voluntary
action; there was, therefore, no reason it could not do so by consent decree. Id. at 3073; see
Overton v. City of Austin, 748 F.2d 941, 956 n.18 (5th Cir. 1984). As long as the city officials
whose discretion is limited by the decree continue to wish to abide by it, it presents none of
the problems discussed in this article. Whether future city officials will be able to modify or
rescind the agreement is a more difficult issue, not addressed in Local Number 93.
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sors, it is a pure bootstrap argument to say that he can do so by
forging an agreement with a private party and submitting it to a
court.
Although my principal focus in this article is on federal sepa-
ration of powers, these principles have wider applications. At the
state and local level, consent decrees are sometimes used to evade
the political power of other branches and levels of government. For
example, a city council may be precluded, under state law, from
making certain decisions without a popular referendum. It follows
that the city council may not evade the referendum requirement
by entering a consent decree promising to make those decisions.",
The constitutional standard thus applies beyond the context of an
executive official and his successors: a consent decree gains no legal
force by the "consent" of officials who lack the power to make the
relevant substantive decision in the absence of the decree.
C. Legal Consequences of Finding That a Decree Violates Consti-
tutional Principles
That a consent decree may unconstitutionally interfere with
policy-making discretion vested in a government official does not,
in and of itself, render the decree void. Among the class of consent
decrees that theoretically intrude into the constitutional discretion
of the incumbent President, many will accord with current policy
and thus not raise actual problems. It is only when officials later
wish to exercise their constitutionally-vested discretion contrary to
the terms of a decree that an actual, ripe constitutional contro-
versy arises. The issue, therefore, is not so much the legality of a
given consent decree as the availablity of specific performance if
the incumbent no longer deems compliance to be in the public
interest.34
The court asked to enforce the decree must determine whether
it comports with these constitutional principles. If it does not, this
does not mean that the decree was "unlawful" in any sense. No
criticism is implied of the signatories or of the court that entered
the decree. Rather, this simply means that the officials whose dis-
cretion is limited are entitled to modification or rescission to the
extent that the decree goes beyond constitutionally enforceable
limits. Other portions of the decree, if severable, should still be
" See text at notes 81-86 for examples.
Where the decree limits the discretion of other branches or levels of government
rather than that of future officeholders, the legal consequence of a finding that the decree
violates the Constitution is that the decree is void and of no legal effect.
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enforced. In other words, to the extent that the decree is constitu-
tionally unenforceable, a change in government policy, without
more, must be considered a legitimate basis for modification of the
decree.35
This does not mean that government officials are free to vio-
late outstanding consent decrees that they may believe to be un-
constitutional. Until the court has reached the conclusion that the
decree is unenforceable, the consent decree stands as a binding
court judgment. Nor does it mean that the private party to the
decree is left without a remedy. On the contrary, that party is enti-
tled to some other form of relief that will restore the status quo
ante. In the typical public law case, nothing more is required than
to permit the private party to reopen the litigation, because the
party has given up nothing other than the lawsuit. If the private
party assumed obligations under the decree, however, it must be
freed of those obligations, just as the government is freed of its
obligations. Moreover, if the private party has suffered any con-
crete loss, the government is required to make it whole. 6
Rescissions of consent decrees under this standard may in
practice be quite rare. Powerful, if informal, pressures disincline
government officials to breach prior commitments made by their
agencies, even if there is no legal compulsion. The prospect of rein-
stitution of the lawsuit is one such pressure. But when the official
determines that the public interest in changing policy outweighs
the considerations against, these principles offer a standard for
modifying or vacating consent decrees that better accords with the
Constitution's allocation of decision-making discretion.
D. Practical Problems of Applying These Legal Standards
Balanced against these considerations of democratic accounta-
bility is the practical usefulness of the consent decree, in appropri-
ate cases, for the expeditious resolution of legal controversies. Pro-
tections against improper or abusive decrees should not be made so
sweeping that they eliminate the incentives for voluntary settle-
ment where it would be in the public interest. Two specific practi-
cal objections may be made to a strict enforcement of legal limits
35 Several distinguished lower court judges have proposed substantial loosening of the
standards for modification of public law consent decrees. See note 12.
" The right to compensation for property loss has its source in the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the right to reinstate the lawsuit has its source in the
substantive law that was the basis for the original lawsuit. The private party is relieved of
its obligations under the decree under ordinary principles of contract law.
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on consent decrees. First, it may sometimes be difficult, without
trial, to determine the extent of relief a district court could order
and, hence, the lawful scope of a consent decree. Second, the adop-
tion of these principles will make settlement of lawsuits against
government officials more difficult. I will provide reasons why these
objections should be given little weight, and show that in other
contexts (procurement and plea bargaining) similar limits on spe-
cific performance of government commitments have not seriously
inhibited contracting with the government.
1. The Difficulty of Determining Lawful Scope of Relief
Without Trial. The first practical difficulty is how to apply the
first criterion for a lawful consent decree-whether the court would
have authority to order the relief if the case proceeded to judg-
ment-without a trial. How is it possible to tell whether the con-
sent decree goes beyond what the court could have ordered if there
has been no determination on the facts or the law of the case?
For a large number of cases-including all but one of the ex-
amples discussed in the next section 3 7-this poses no problem, be-
cause the consent decree unmistakably goes beyond any conceiva-
ble court order. In Chicago Board of Education, for example, the
United States was the plaintiff and the Board of Education was
the wrongdoer; there was no basis whatsoever for any relief against
the United States on behalf of the Board. The imposition of multi-
million dollar liability was obviously beyond the court's power.3 8
In other cases, determining whether the decree was within the
range of permissible judicial remedies had the case gone to trial
will not be difficult, because the scope of the relief is a pure ques-
tion of law. The court asked to enforce, vacate, or modify the de-
cree can as easily assess the merits of the case as the court that
entered the decree. This is likely to be the situation in the large
majority of consent decrees against the government in regulatory
programs, since the issue is rarely the factual question of what the
government has done, but virtually always the legal question of
what the government's responsibilities are. In the large majority of
cases involving consent decrees that impinge on executive discre-
tion, the underlying issue is one of continuing government policy
or conduct. While there may be issues of fact, they are unlikely to
grow stale. Hindsight and additional experience may even make it
7 Overton v. City of Austin, 748 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1984), is the exception. See text at
notes 85-86. There, the district court declined to enter the decree without proof that it was
warranted by law.
11 See text at notes 60-61.
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easier to resolve the issues in the case. A private party to the de-
cree is not likely to be prejudiced by a postponement of a trial
from the initial stage of the litigation to the decree enforcement
stage. ,Moreover, if the relief requested depends heavily on the spe-
cific conduct of particular government officials, this may be reason
to deny continued relief against subsequent officeholders who
played no part in the initial wrongdoing. 9
In the small number of cases in which the scope of relief de-
pends upon factual showings that have become difficult to make
when the government officials decide to challenge the decree, it
may be appropriate for the subsequent court to defer more readily
to the plaintiffs' initial allegations. It may also be prudent, where
such problems are anticipated, for the parties to the consent de-
cree to lay a factual predicate for the decree at the time it is
made.40
2. Effect on Settlements. Some have warned that adherence
to the principles limiting consent decrees could make it harder to
resolve disputes through compromise and settlement.4' I am skep-
tical. Defenders of discretion-limiting consent decrees assure us
that this form of settlement is rare.42 Their claim is plausible, since
good faith efforts to settle litigation will ordinarily reflect compro-
mise; it is an unusual "compromise" that goes beyond the relief the
court might grant if the case were litigated to judgment. Good
faith compromise of legal disputes should not be seriously inhib-
ited by these principles.
Moreover, private parties will seldom stand to lose from enter-
ing a consent decree with the government-even if they know that
a future officeholder can withdraw when he concludes that the con-
sent decree is contrary to the public interest. The private party
will obtain the relief it seeks for some period of time, perhaps for-
ever, without the expense of trial. Future officials may not object
to the substantive terms of the decree; and even if they do, they
may be restrained from seeking to rescind it because of regulatory
3 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370.77 (1976).
40 Compare Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(f) (court may not approve plea bargain unless
there is a factual basis for the guilty plea).
41 See, for example, Percival, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 341, 343-44 (cited in note 13).
42 See text at note 59; Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 277 (cited in note 9); Percival,
1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 338, 344. See also Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14 n.18, Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984) (denial of certiorari) (the Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment decree "is not typical of the methods usually chosen by the [EPA] to compromise
litigation") (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
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inertia, political pressure, or the desire to maintain good will with
parties that have frequent contacts with the agency.43 The worst
scenario for the private party is that, at some point in the future, it
will have to litigate the issues. This is not likely to be perceived as
a bad deal.
The only settlements likely to be seriously inhibited are those
in which present officials choose to bargain away their successors'
constitutional authority rather than face the present consequences
of litigation, including the possibility of losing. If these settlements
are inhibited, it is all to the good.
Even if this constitutional rule did discourage some settlement
agreements that are in the public interest, this would not be dis-
positive. In many contexts, agreements (some of which may be
beneficial) are made void or voidable because of a potential for
abuse. Plea bargains, for example, are a useful means of settling
criminal litigation; but it does not follow that plea bargains should
be enforced even if they have the potential for violating constitu-
tional rights."" Similarly, I do not think that the potential encour-
agement of settlements in cases against the government could pos-
sibly justify actual infringement of the executive's constitutional
discretion.
3. Experience in Other Contexts. Concerns that an inability
to bind future executive discretion will inhibit the settlement pro-
cess ring hollow when we examine two closely related areas: pro-
curement contracts and plea bargains.
a. Procurement Contracts. Every procurement contract en-
tered by the federal government contains a "termination for conve-
nience" clause. This permits the contracting officer to terminate
the contract at any time prior to completion, in whole or in part, if
in his judgment the public convenience so demands.4 5 The decision
to terminate is within the executive's discretion; the government
need not even supply a reason.4e In the event of a termination, the
contractor is entitled only to performance costs incurred prior to
"' This is apparently what happened in Citizens for a Better Environment. See Brief
for Federal Respondent at 12-14 (cited in note 42).
" See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (1987) (plea bargains contain-
ing promise by the accused not to sue officials under Section 1983 are unenforceable under
some circumstances); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(f) (court may not approve plea unless it has
a factual basis).
,1 See Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. §§ 8.405-06 (1986); Dennis J. Riley, 2
Federal Contracts, Grants & Assistance 324-67 (1983).
"' 18 Comp. Gen. 826, 828 (1939); 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 225, 231-32 (1942); 22 Op. Att'y
Gen. 437, 441-42 (1899).
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receipt of the termination notice (and to profits on those costs, if
any) and to the costs of termination. The contractor is not entitled
to the usual compensation for anticipated profits, nor to conse-
quential damages.47 As one commentator has noted, under these
clauses "[t]he government's right to terminate a contract for its
convenience exceeds the usual rights of a party to a private
contract.
48
Although termination clauses are now required by federal reg-
ulation, the government's power to rescind procurement contracts
was first recognized by the Supreme Court in a case in which there
was neither an express clause in the contract nor a statute or regu-
lation authorizing it. The Court reasoned that "it would be of seri-
ous detriment to the public service if the power of the [contracting
department] did not extend to providing for all such possible con-
tingencies by modification or suspension of the contracts. .. .
The decision might well have been bottomed, instead, on constitu-
tional principles. By recognizing the executive's right to modify or
terminate a contract, the Court ensured that the power of future
Congresses to determine appropriations and of future executives to
determine military and domestic needs would not be diminished
by the prior contracts of predecessor executive officials. Protecting
future discretion, in this context, has evidently not seriously inhib-
ited private contractors from doing business with the federal
government.
b. Plea Bargains and Nonprosecution Agreements. When a
prosecutor strikes a plea bargain with a criminal defendant, future
prosecutorial discretion is necessarily limited. In Santobello v.
New York, 50 the Supreme Court held that when a guilty plea en-
tered by a criminal defendant "rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be ful-
filled.''51 The reason for this is that a guilty plea constitutes the
waiver of important constitutional rights. Such a waiver must be
"voluntary and knowing;" if it was based on a false premise-such
as a prosecutorial promise that is not executed-then the guilty
plea itself is voidable.
'" Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 49.202 (cited in note 45). See also Riley,
2 Federal Contracts, Grants & Assistance at 328, 341-43, 345-46 (cited in note 45). The only
exceptions are for instances of government misconduct. Id. at 346.
Id. at 325.
' United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321, 323 (1875).
'0 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
Id. at 262.
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While future prosecutorial discretion is limited by the plea
bargain, it does not follow that a criminal defendant can obtain
specific performance of the bargain over the objections of the gov-
ernment.52 Both the logic of the due process claim53 and the prece-
dents of the Supreme Court 4 make clear that the remedy for a
prosecutor's breach is to permit the defendant to withdraw his
plea. While due process demands that the defendant be made no
worse off because of the abortive bargain, he need not be given the
benefit of his bargain.
The nonprosecution agreement is more complicated,5 and the
law regarding enforcement of such-agreements is unsettled. By
statute, the prosecutor is authorized to promise only use and deriv-
ative use immunity for testimony, not full transactional immunity,
and then only with court approval.5 6 Informally, however, prosecu-
tors sometimes promise full indemnity from prosecution if a poten-
tial defendant cooperates with an investigation. If these promises
were specifically enforceable, they would be executive decisions
that bind future executive discretion. In fact, the lower courts were
split on the enforceability of these agreements in much the same
way they are split on consent decrees. Some courts would enforce
the agreements. Others held that due process demands no more
than that accused's testimony not be held against him.5 7 The anal-
ysis here supports the latter decisions. The argument is now aca-
demic, since the Supreme Court has held that statutory immunity
2 In many instances, the government will prefer specific performance as the remedy for
an inadvertent breach, because conducting a trial is no longer possible. See Santobello, 404
U.S. at 263 (question is "whether the circumstances of this case require only that there be
specific performance of the agreement"); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir.
1974) (describing specific performance as "the lesser relief" when compared with withdrawal
of the plea); United States v. Garcia, 698 F.2d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 1983) (defendant requested
withdrawal of plea as remedy for government's breach of plea bargain; government re-
quested equivalent of specific performance).
63 If the constitutional concern is the defective waiver of constitutional rights (to jury
trial, to confront one's accusers, to present witnesses, to remain silent, and to be convicted
by proof beyond all reasonable doubt), then the proper remedy is to have those rights
restored.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510 n.11 (1984).
"5 The difference between a nonprosecution agreement and a plea bargain is that no
guilty plea is entered in the former; the prosecutor promises not to prosecute in exchange
for cooperation (usually testimony) by the criminal suspect. Professor Shane cites non-
prosecution agreements as his foremost concrete example of executive promises that bind
future executive discretion. Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 256-58 (cited in note 9).
8 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982). See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1962).
67 See Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, 1 Criminal Procedure § 8.11(d), at 691-92
(1984). It is difficult to see, after Santobello and Mabry, why nonprosecution agreements
should be more susceptible to specific performance than plea bargains.
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is the exclusive means by which prosecutors can promise
immunity.58
Thus, in other significant contexts, private parties find it in
their interest to strike bargains with the government, even though
they are not assured of specific performance if successor officials
later determine that the bargain is not in the public interest. As
long as they receive compensation for their actual (and not antici-
patory) property losses and are restored to their pre-bargain legal
rights, their position is enhanced by agreements with the govern-
ment on these terms. If procurement contracts can be entered and
plea bargains made without sacrificing future executive discretion,
there is no reason consent decrees cannot meet the same standard.
II. EXAMPLES OF UNLAWFUL DECREES
Since these constitutional principles follow from the very logic
of consent decrees, one might wonder whether any actual consent
decrees could have violated them. Informed observers state that
consent decrees of this sort have been rare.59 But two recent de-
crees, both upheld by federal courts and defended by Professor
Shane, plainly fall into the unconstitutional category, as do a sur-
prising number of other decrees entered by state officials. Other
federal consent decrees would apparently present the same
problems were they enforced by their terms in the courts. And if
the device is legitimated, they may cease to be so rare. Consent
decrees could become the philosopher's stone of administrative
law, transmuting ephemeral power into irrevocable policy. The fol-
lowing examples are presented to indicate the breadth and serious-
ness of the problem.
A. United States v. Chicago Board of Education
In United States v. Chicago Board of Education,° the Carter
Justice Department sued the Board of Education for unlawful seg-
regation of the public schools. The parties ended the litigatin by
consent decree. The Board agreed to desegregate; the federal gov-
ernment agreed to use its "best efforts" to find "available" funds
to facilitate the desegregation plan. This latter provision was inter-
preted by the district court as committing future Presidents to
support legislative measures to provide significant amounts of fed-
" United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616-17 (1984).
" See sources cited in note 42.
'0 See note 7 for citations of complete case history.
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eral financial aid to the Chicago school system. Thus, when Presi-
dent Reagan proposed nationwide changes in federal education
policy, including a reduction in federal aid, an increase in local
flexibility in using aid, and the elimination of the federal Depart-
ment of Education, the district court held that the United States
had violated the consent decree, in bad faith."
Under the standards set out above, this decree, as interpreted,
should have been held unlawful and unenforceable. First, it con-
tained relief that no court would have had authority to order in the
underlying lawsuit. Since the entire basis of the lawsuit was that
the Chicago Board of Education had segregated its schools in vio-
lation of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection
Clause-which the United States was suing to enforce-the court
had no authority to order any relief whatsoever against the United
States. The United States had no legal obligation to the Board.
Second, outside the context of the consent decree, officials of the
Carter Administration had no authority to limit future Presidents'
recommendations to Congress conceiing levels of spending for ed-
ucation. The voters have the right, as a matter of fundamental
democratic principle, to elect Presidents who might wish to change
the level of spending for education. It is illegitimate for one Ad-
ministration to sign an agreement with an outside party that at-
tempts to prevent the voters' decision from having practical effect.
B. Citizens for a Better Environment
In Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,62 the Ford
Justice Department entered a consent decree promising that future
Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency would tar-
get twenty-one named industries for investigation. This consent
decree, like that in Chicago Board of Education, violated the prin-
ciples set forth above. First, although the Administrator was the
defendant in the underlying lawsuit, the parties conceded that the
court would have had no authority, absent agreement by the gov-
ernment lawyers, to impose this form of relief. The statute vested
discretion to choose the targets for investigation in the Adminis-
trator,63 and there was not the slightest suggestion in the legisla-
tion that these twenty-one industries had to be among them.64
61 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir.
1983); 588 F. Supp. 132, vacated and remanded, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984).
02 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
'3 See Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 246-48, 262 (cited in note 9).
61 Robert Percival defends the decree on the ground that the Environmental Protection
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Second, outside the context of a consent decree, one Adminis-
trator would have no authority to limit his successors' investiga-
tory discretion. Presumably, an Administrator could promulgate a
regulation targeting the twenty-one industries for investigation;
but future Administrators would have just as much authority to
revoke regulations as past Administrators had to impose them. 5
Since the court had no power to order it, and the Administrator
had no power to agree to it, this consent decree should not have
been given binding legal effect.
C. Other Possible Violations
While Chicago Board of Education and Citizens for a Better
Environment are the clearest cases, other consent decrees or settle-
ments entered by the federal government have potentially violated
the principles set forth above.6 In National Audobon Society, Inc.
v. Watt,67 for example, the Carter Justice Department entered into
a stipulation and agreement that the executive branch would not
move ahead with a public dam project authorized by Congress, and
that it would submit legislative proposals to Congress modifying
the project's scope. Five years later, under a new Administration,
the executive wished to proceed with the project. The settlement
seemed to violate constitutional principles, since both the promise
to submit legislation and the promise to postpone construction
Agency ("EPA") had been in violation of time limits for the promulgation of standards.
Percival, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 338-40 (cited in note 13). While this statutory violation
presumably could be the basis for a remedy, however, it could provide no justification for
this sort of remedy. In effect, Mr. Percival's group, the Environmental Defense Fund
("EDF"), bargained with EPA to allow the agency to violate the unrealistic time limits set
by Congress, in exchange for giving the EDF a degree of control over the agency's substan-
tive policy. This sort of bargain bears no resemblance to the statutory scheme, and has the
alarming feature of effectively delegating governmental authority to a private interest group.
Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
0" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (same substan-
tive standard of judicial review applies to revocation of rules as to their initial
promulgation).
"0 The decree in Ferrell v. Pierce, 743 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1984), is sometimes cited as
going beyond constitutional limits. See Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 251-53 (cited in note
9). In Ferrell, Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") officials signed a
decree agreeing to certain procedures for implementation of a mortgage relief program, and
limiting the discretion of their successors to modify the procedures for five years. Whether
this decree was lawful depends on whether any alternative procedures HUD might have
wished to adopt would satisfy the strict statutory requirements. This issue was not resolved
in Ferrell because soon after the decree was entered Congress amended the underlying stat-
ute. The dispositive issue in Ferrell was Congress's intent in passing the subsequent amend-
ments. See Ferrell, 743 F.2d at 467-71 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
67 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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went beyond what a court could have ordered,68 and purported to
limit the constitutionally-vested discretion of future executives.
The court of appeals avoided these "extremely interesting, ...
novel, and far-reaching" constitutional issues by construing the de-
cree as containing an implied time limit, which had already
passed. 9
Similarly, in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago,70
the FBI settled a lawsuit charging First Amendment violations by
a consent decree which, according to one reasonable interpreta-
tion,71 went "further than the First Amendment" in restricting the
FBI's investigatory powers.7 2 Eighteen months later, the Attorney
General issued new guidelines for FBI investigations, and the pri-
vate parties to the decree sought to enjoin those guidelines. Ob-
serving that "naturally a court will hesitate to assume that by sign-
ing a consent decree the government knowingly bartered away
important public interests merely to avoid the expense of a trial, ' 3
and that the broader interpretation of the decree "maybe even vio-
lat[ed] the President's constitutional obligation to 'take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed,' ,,74 the court of appeals construed
the decree narrowly to preserve the FBI's investigatory discretion
within only the substantive limits imposed by the Constitution.
In Women's Equity Action League v. Bell,7 5 federal officials
charged with the responsibility of enforcing various civil rights
laws challenged the constitutionality of an earlier consent decree
which, they contended, "violate[d] fundamental principles of sepa-
ration of powers" by "usurp[ing]" the discretion of the executive
branch in a number of ways. The decree, among other things, com-
mitted the government to a particular strategy for civil rights en-
forcement, which was not specified by statute, and subjected
budget decisions to supervision by plaintiffs' lawyers and the
court.7 6 While expressing no opinion on "the legality of the consent
"s In the meantime, the executive branch had completed all necessary environmental
analyses, and no further legal obstacles to construction (other than the stipulation) existed.
Id. at 303.
69 Id. at 305 n.12, 310-11.
70 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
7' The court of appeals expressly noted that the words of the decree "will bear" this
interpretation. Id. at 1011.
72 Id. at 1016.
73 Id. at 1013.
71 Id. at 1014.
7- 743 F.2d 42, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
7' An account of the separation of powers issues in the case is found in Jeremy Rabkin,
Captive of the Court: A Federal Agency in Receivership, Regulation 16 (May/June 1984).
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decree," the court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether there existed a justiciable case or
controversy."
In an interesting case at the local level, White v. Roughton,7 8
township officials settled a constitutional challenge to the proce-
dures used in administering a local welfare program by entering a
decree that promised, on its face, that the township would main-
tain its substantive welfare standards "from this day forward.179
Four years later, the township board of trustees repealed the wel-
fare program. The plaintiffs sought to hold the township and its
officials in contempt of the decree. Under the principles outlined
above, this aspect of the decree was unenforceable, since the court
would have had no authority in a procedural due process case to
order indefinite continuance of a substantive program, and because
government officials apparently have no authority under state law
to make such a promise. Without reaching the constitutional issue,
the court dismissed the action. Stating that "we doubt the town-
ship was so inept a bargainer that it gave the plaintiffs not only all
the procedures they wanted but also substantive entitlements to
which they had no possible claim," the court construed the decree
as governing only procedures.80
In each of these cases, officials had entered consent decrees
that appear to be unconstitutional under the analysis presented
here. In each, the court of appeals avoided the constitutional ques-
tion, either by construing the decree narrowly or by resorting to
justiciability doctrines. While this approach may well be the most
prudent for the courts, the cases do not inspire confidence that
government officials-unassisted by later reviewing courts-will re-
frain from bargaining away the constitutional discretion of their
successors when short-term considerations seem to demand it.
D. A Variation on the Theme: Consent Decrees that Sidestep
Political Constraints
Consent decrees do not only purport to bind the future; some-
times they unbind the present from political restraints from coor-
dinate branches of government or the people. In Dunn v. Carey,s '
7 Women's Equity, 743 F.2d at 44.
78 689 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1982).
7 Id. at 119. The court of appeals conceded that the language of the decree was "unam-
biguous." Id. at 120.
1o Id. at 121.
81 808 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1986).
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for example, state law limited the power of local officials to con-
struct new public buildings. A group of plaintiffs-detainees at a
county jail-sued county officials for providing allegedly inade-
quate jail facilities. The officials signed a consent decree, by which
they agreed to construct a new jail, police and city hall complex, to
be financed through new taxes. While not "imply[ing] that this
particular decree was a conscious evasion or that the litigation be-
came collusive," the court of appeals speculated that the county
officials had been "frustrated by their inability to win political ap-
proval for the construction of a new city hall. 's2 Since the district
court obviously did not have authority to order construction of a
new city hall or police headquarters and since the county officials
lacked authority to authorize these buildings, the consent decree
was unconstitutional and unenforceable under the standards
presented here.
Another troublesome example is compromise by the executive
of constitutional challenges to legislative enactments. This can
have the effect of thwarting legislative will, usurping judicial re-
sponsibility, and binding future executive discretion, all in one
consent decree. As one court has noted, for a government lawyer to
agree to a consent judgment holding a state law unconstitutional
confuses "the three branches of government." "An attorney gen-
eral," the court stated, "can have no authority to be the binding
determiner that legislation is unconstitutional." 83 While an attor-
ney for the government may be able to exercise prosecutorial dis-
cretion and not enforce a statute he believes to be unconstitu-
tional, he cannot impose this judgment on his successors. And
while an attorney for the government may express his view to the
court that a statute is unconstitutional and decline to defend it,
the court remains responsible for reaching its own judgment on the
legal issue.8 4
The consent decree device has even been used to alter the
form of government without popular consent. In Overton v. City of
Austin, 5 a Voting Rights Act suit, the city council signed a decree
agreeing to change from an at-large to a single-member district
election system. Under state law, however, such changes in the city
82 Id. at 560.
83 National Revenue Corp. v. Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 288 (1st Cir. 1986).
Id. See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939-40 (1983); Strauss v. United States, 516
F.2d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. State of Texas, 680 F.2d 356, 370 (5th Cir.
1982).
85 748 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1984).
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charter required a vote of the people. The district court accord-
ingly refused to enter the decree as a judgment of the court in the
absence of proof that the prior at-large system was in violation of
the Act. The court of appeals affirmed, stating,
The court here is not being asked merely to put its sanc-
tions behind a substantive result that the parties would
be empowered to achieve themselves, as in the case of the
usual consent decree; rather, it is being asked to effectu-
ate a substantive result which the parties wholly lack the
jurisdictional power to bring about by themselves ...
Absent a properly grounded judicial determination that
the present charter provisions are illegal, the consent of
the parties provides an insufficient basis on which to ju-
dicially ordain a different system of council election and
composition."
These examples demonstrate that the enforcement of consent
decrees must be subjected to constitutional discipline. Consent de-
crees that block ordinary avenues of political change or that side-
step political constraints are neither so few nor so trivial as to jus-
tify reliance on the good judgment and self-restraint of
government lawyers. Real issues of democratic accountability are
at stake.
III. DEFENSES OFFERED FOR DISCRETION-LIMITING CONSENT
DECREES
Even defenders of discretion-limiting consent decrees are
forced to concede that some executive powers are so central to the
constitutional scheme that they must not be bargained away in the
settlement of a lawsuit. It would be absurd, for example, to think
that one President could make a legally binding promise that sub-
sequent Presidents would veto particular legislation. Thus, Profes-
sor Shane acknowledges that "any purported promise, say, not to
veto any environmental protection bill voted by Congress during
the next five years could not have legal force. '87 He reaches the
same conclusion with regard to the President's power to grant par-
dons.8 Consent decrees making promises concerning the future ex-
ercise of the veto or pardon powers, he states, would be unenforce-
able because they would amount to a "disruption" of a "critical...
8" Id. at 956-57 (footnote omitted).
87 Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 255 (cited in note 9).
8 Id. at 256.
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aspect of the framers' design."8"
Applying this logic to all the powers of the executive would,
however, lead to the conclusion I have urged here-and to invali-
dation of the very consent decrees Professor Shane has set out to
defend. Defenders of these decrees find it necessary, therefore, to
establish a hierarchy of executive powers, with some of them "criti-
cal to the framers' design" and others less so. Non-"critical" execu-
tive powers could be circumscribed by consent decree even though
"critical" executive powers, like the veto and pardon powers, could
not.
Professor Shane thus distinguishes between two categories of
discretion-limiting consent decrees: those that limit future "consti-
tutionally-vested" presidential discretion and those that limit
merely "statutorily-vested" discretion. The former category is gen-
erally unenforceable in the absence of an "overriding public inter-
est," at least if it has the potential to disrupt the executive
branch's performance of its assigned constitutional duties. The lat-
ter category is generally enforceable, unless it is in "contravention
of statute" or it cannot "reasonably be regarded as within Con-
gress's authorization" (apparently generously understood).90
It is easy to understand the reluctance to make a stark choice:
discretion-limiting consent decrees, as defined above, are enforcea-
ble, or they are not."1 But the precarious middle ground position
nevertheless undermines a central tenet of democracy: the people,
and their elected officials, must be allowed to change their minds.
Even in the more-protected area of "constitutional" discretion, the
application of the standard is weak; in the area of "statutory" dis-
cretion there is no real protection at all.
89 Id. at 258.
90 Id. at 265.
1' Professor Shane's position on consent decrees is of a piece with his overall preference
for ad hoc "balancing" over rule-governed adjudication in separation of powers cases. See id.
at 256-59, 268-70, 278 n.136, 286-87. He ascribes this jurisprudential approach to recent
Supreme Court decisions, which take a functional, rather than a categorical view of the
separation of powers. Id. at 278. This does not, however, paint an accurate picture of mod-
ern Supreme Court separation of powers cases. Except where Richard Nixon was a party
(and of course such cases are subject to a different constitutional standard altogether), sepa-
ration of powers cases have taken a decided turn toward what its critics decry as "formal-
ism" and I prefer to view as a natural reading of the text and structure of the Constitution.
See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Northern




A. "Constitutionally Vested" Discretion
Not all consent decrees that invade "constitutionally vested"
executive discretion are unlawful, according to Professor Shane's
schema. His example of constitutionally-vested discretion that can
be bargained away is the President's power to recommend legisla-
tion to Congress-the power implicated in Chicago Board of Edu-
cation. He finds "persuasive" the argument that President Carter's
lawyers could make a judicially enforceable promise that President
Reagan would not recommend cuts in future budgets for elemen-
tary and secondary education. "[T]he interference with executive
responsibilities is limited," Professor Shane says, and, after all, the
consent decree avoided "the extraordinary effort and expense of a
trial."9' 2
The problem with this approach is that it provides no coher-
ent basis for determining which presidential powers may be bar-
gained away and which cannot. Under what theory could the Presi-
dent's power to veto be inviolable, while his power to recommend
legislation is not? The Constitution expressly vests the power to
recommend legislation to Congress in the President, as a matter of
his personal discretion: the President "shall from time to time...
recommend to [Congress's] Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient." 93 It cannot be denied that
the Chicago consent decree, as interpreted, interfered with this
constitutional responsibility. President Reagan considered his edu-
cation "Measures" "necessary and expedient"; yet the consent de-
cree forbade him to recommend them to Congress.
The President's power to promote a legislative program is riot
an insignificant power. It lies at the heart of the President's func-
tion as chief executive; it is one of the principal reasons why voters
select one candidate over another. As Hamilton wrote to Washing-
ton, it is "of the utmost importance" that the President "should
trace out in his own mind such a plan as he thinks it would be
eligible to pursue and should endeavor by proper and constitu-
tional means to give the deliberations of Congress a direction to-
wards that plan. '9 4 To allow a President's predecessors to limit his
political discretion in this way does every bit as much violence to
the "framers' design" as a promise to pardon perpetrators of par-
ticular offenses-probably more.
92 Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 260 (cited in note 9).
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, c. 1.
N Harold C. Syrett, ed., 16 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 277 (letter to George
Washington, Apr. 14, 1794).
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There is no calculus for determining which of the President's
constitutional powers are more important than the others. But
even if there were, this would not explain how those "less impor-
tant" powers could be stripped away short of constitutional
amendment. Neither the acts of presidential predecessors nor laws
passed by Congress are of greater dignity than the Constitution
itself. The defenders of consent decrees limiting constitutional dis-
cretion have yet to explain what higher authority permits consent
decrees to take from the President discretion vested in him by the
Constitution.
B. "Statutorily Vested" Discretion
Under Professor Shane's schema, discretion vested in the
President by statute receives even less protection. Indeed, it can be
overridden by any consent decree "reasonably in the interests of
the United States. 9 5 Professor Shane cites Citizens for a Better
Environment as an example of a consent decree that legitimately
impinges on the President's "statutorily vested" discretion. Profes-
sor Shane sees no reason not to enforce, in 1983, a promise made in
1976 by President Ford's lawyers that future Administrators would
deploy their investigative resources in a particular way. This was a
fairly minimal intrusion into the ordinary discretion of the EPA,
Professor Shane assures us,96 even though, as he explains,97 the se-
lection of targets for investigation is an ordinary part of law en-
forcement discretion and there was not the slightest suggestion
that the underlying statute curtailed it.9 8
This approach provides essentially no protection for "statuto-
rily vested" discretion. It will virtually always be possible, except
when the terms of the decree violate independent legal require-
ments, to find some basis for arguing that the decree reflects a
"reasonable" enforcement strategy and is in the public interest.
Whether executive discretion is to receive protection thus depends
entirely on whether the discretion is classified as "constitutionally
vested" or "statutorily vested."
Most troubling about this approach, therefore, is its failure to
recognize that the President's discretion to supervise the enforce-
" Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 265 (cited in note 9).
96 Id. at 262.
1 Id. at 246-48.
98 Compare Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980) (courts may not limit choices within the range of executive discretion); Federal
Comm'n v. Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940) (same).
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ment of statutes passed by Congress is constitutionally as well as
statutorily based. Professor Shane states that "the executive's en-
tire decision-making authority" in cases of domestic social and eco-
nomic regulation "comes from Congress."99 It does not. Congress
determines the content of the law, and determines which
subordinate officials shall enforce it; but the Constitution vests re-
sponsibility for overseeing their performance in the President
alone. Article II, Section 3 provides that the President "shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 100 This he cannot do if
his predecessors have made judicially enforceable promises that he
will not change their enforcement strategies without the agreement
of a private interest group. The "take Care" responsibility is a vital
aspect of the "framers' design." It may not be bartered away by
former officials, transferred to courts, or delegated to private
parties.
In one important respect, interference with the "take Care"
responsibility is a more complicated matter than is interference
with other constitutional powers of the President. The precise
scope of the President's "take Care" power in any given circum-
stance is determined by the "laws" he is entrusted with executing.
The content of those laws, in turn, is set by Congress. Thus, if
Congress passes legislation changing the law, the nature and scope
of the "take Care" authority is modified. This makes it difficult, in
the abstract, to rule out the possibility that Congress could dele-
gate legislative-type authority to an executive in such a way as to
enable a predecessor's decisions to affect the scope of his succes-
sor's "take Care" authority."' None of the cases, and nothing in
Professor Shane's article, suggests any actual instance that raises
this problem. Outside this hypothetical possibility, consent decrees
that invade the President's "take Care" responsibility should be
" Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 261 (cited in note 9).
oo This is not the occasion to explore whether Congress could vest this discretion in an
"independent" agency. I agree with my colleagues Geoffrey Miller and David Currie that it
could not. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41; David P.
Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 19, 34-36. But
whether or not this position is correct, the Constitution does not contemplate that executive
discretion be vested in the dead hand of past government lawyers, subject to modifications
approved by particular private interest groups.
101 For example, Congress might enact a new regulatory statute under which the execu-
tive issues regulations with the force and effect of law. Arguably it might be constitutional,
at least with sufficient justification, for Congress to provide that once the initial regulations
were promulgated they would remain in force for the next ten years. If so, then the succes-
sor President's discretion to interpret the new statute could be limited by the preceding
administration's regulations.
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treated under the same standard as all others.
V. AN ANALOGY TO IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS
Professor Shane's attempts to distinguish among various
forms of consent decrees that interfere with executive discretion is
reminiscent of a long period of constitutional jurisprudence under
the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10, which forbids the
states from passing any laws "impairing the obligation of con-
tracts." Well over 200 times the Supreme Court has wrestled with
how to enforce state contracts without interfering with the State's
sovereign prerogative to change its policies. Of all the lines of con-
stitutional doctrine, this provides the closest parallel to the con-
sent decree problem.
The variations on the theme are infinite, but the essentials of
the scenario are the same. A State contracts with a private party.
If the private party will do something beneficial to the State (build
a bridge, open a factory), then the State will make certain conces-
sions (exemption from tax, guarantee against regulation). Years
later, the State no longer wishes to comply with its side of the bar-
gain. It wishes to impose the tax, or enforce the regulation. Absent
the contract, the State would have the sovereign authority to
change its tax laws and its regulatory programs. Which will prevail:
the private party's contract right, or the State's sovereign power?
As an original matter, one might be tempted to say that the
Contracts Clause has no bearing on the matter. There are strong
indications in the history that the Clause was intended to apply
only to private contracts, not to contracts entered by the govern-
ment.10 2 Notwithstanding this history, the Contracts Clause has
112 The original proposal, by Rufus King, was in the language of the Northwest Ordi-
nance: "no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall in any
manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide and
without fraud previously formed." 32 Journal of the Continental Congress 340 (1936)
(Northwest Ordinance); Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787
at 439-440 (1911) (King proposal). Debate in the Convention centered entirely on whether
this proposal "would be going too far." Id. (Gov. Morris). There is no reason to infer that
the later deletion of the word "private" was intended to bring government contracts within
its ambit. A leading South Carolina delegate to the Convention explained to his state con-
vention that the Clause would prevent states from "interfering in private contracts."
Jonathan Elliot, ed., 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 334 (1888) (Charles Pinckney) ("Debates"). The only unequivocal
statements that the Clause applied to public contracts were made by opponents of the Con-
stitution who used this expansive interpretation of the Clause as an argument against ratifi-
cation. 4 Debates at 190 (James Galloway); 3 Debates at 474 (Patrick Henry). One of them,
Patrick Henry, appeared to be answering an unrecorded assertion to the contrary by James
Madison, and both were immediately contradicted by participants in the Convention. 4 De-
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long been held to encompass contracts between state governments
and private parties.1 03 Not surprisingly, many of the cases involv-
ing government contracts turn out to display the same clash, al-
ready seen with regard to consent decrees, between today's power
to enter agreements and tomorrow's power to change policy. While
this is not the occasion for an extended account of how the Su-
preme Court has dealt with the Contracts Clause,104 a brief sum-
mary may serve as a useful corrective to the current ad hoc ap-
proach to the constitutional law of government consent decrees.
In 1810, when the Court first addressed the question, it took
the position that a contract is inviolable, whatever may be the con-
sequences for the sovereign power of the state.10 5 This position
may be compared to the view today that consent decrees are bind-
ing, no matter how severe may be their interference with executive
discretion.106
During the ensuing decades, the Court tempered this ap-
proach, without abandoning its doctrinal position, by employing
the rule that a State's contract must be strictly construed in favor
of the State.107 It thus avoided most egregious impositions on gov-
ernmental authority by holding that the State could not have in-
tended to bargain its sovereign authority away. This position is
comparable to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Alliance to End
Repression.' There, confronted with a consent decree that ap-
peared to bargain away the FBI's investigatory discretion, the
court held that that could not have been the government's inten-
tion when it signed the decree.
bates at 191 (W.R. Davie); 3 Debates at 478 (Gov. Randolph).
Elsewhere, I have shown how this reading of the Contracts Clause comports with the
structure of protection of economic rights in the Constitution. See Michael W. McConnell,
Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual
Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 Calif. L. Rev - (1988). See also Benjamin
Fletcher Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution 3-16 (1938); Edward S. Corwin,
John Marshall and the Constitution 167-68 (1919). But see Richard A. Epstein, Toward a
Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703, 718-21 (1984).
103 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See also United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1976).
104 The classic accounts are Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution (cited in
note 102) and Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 Harv. L.
Rev. 512 (1944). For a recent, if optimistic, explication of the Clause, see Epstein, Toward a
Revitalization of the Contracts Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703 (cited in note 102).
10I See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
106 This appears to be close to the position taken in Percival, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 327
(cited in note 13).
107 See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge et al., 36 U.S. 420 (1837); Fanning v.
Gregoire et al., 57 U.S. 524 (1853); Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U.S. 22 (1906).
108 See text at note 70.
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Beginning in 1848, and increasingly often as the 19th Century
proceeded, the Court began to make exceptions to its obligation of
contract doctrine. First, the Court held that a State could not sign
a contract bargaining away its sovereign power of eminent do-
main.109 Later, other powers of the states were deemed to be so
vital that they could not be alienated by contract: they included
the protection of public health;1 0 the promotion of safety;"' the
preservation of public morals;" 2 and regulation of the use of the
streets,"' and rivers." 4 This position I find quite close to that put
forward by Professor Shane. It allows some contracts that invade
governmental discretion to be enforced, and disallows others, rely-
ing on an apparently ad hoc, common-sense understanding of
which governmental powers are important, and which are not.
The history of the impairment of contracts clause in this pe-
riod is not encouraging for the ad hoc approach. There turns out to
be no satisfactory basis for determining which state powers are
fundamental, and which are not, or for determining how much in-
terference with sovereign power can be tolerated." 5 By the end of
this period, prior contracts were no longer held to be a serious con-
straint on the power of a state government to change its mind
about the exercise of its sovereign powers. As the Supreme Court
stated in Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Tranbarger,"0e
It is established by repeated decisions of this court that
[the impairment of contracts clause does not] have the
effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all
regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health,
safety, or general welfare of the community; that this
power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away.
The only exception has been the rare case when a State has in
effect taken property by its refusal to comply with the bargain." 7
109 The West River Bridge Company v. Dix et al., 47 U.S. 507 (1848).
110 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent
City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
"I Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
112 Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897).
111 Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
1 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
Compare Baltimore v. Baltimore Trust Company, 166 U.S. 673 (1897), with Grand
Trunk West'n Ry. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544 (1913). For an equivalent modern problem,
see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (attempts to
distinguish "traditional state functions" from others are "unworkable").
6 238 U.S. 67, 76-77 (1915).
117 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1976). In these cases it
would be preferable to restore the contracting parties to the position they would have been
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We can spare ourselves a repetition of this analytical confu-
sion by recognizing what the Court in 1810 did not see: allowing
agreements with private parties to block democratic change is in-
consistent with the structure of our political system; and attempt-
ing to draw lines based on what may appear to us to be "minimal,"
"limited," or "substantial" interference with the democratic pro-
cess is hopelessly ad hoc and subjective. Consent decrees are, for
relevant purposes, like contracts. The same logic that drove the
obligation of contracts cases will inevitably drive the consent de-
cree cases as well.
CONCLUSION
The democratic structure of government requires that policies
set through an exercise of discretion must be subject to political
change by the same means. Recent cases have created the possibil-
ity, however, that policies adopted by the executive branch can be
insulated from change at the hands of future executive officers by
incorporating them in the terms of a consent decree with a private
party. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between consent de-
crees as a legitimate tool of compromise and settlement, and con-
sent decrees as an instrument for precluding democratic change. I
have proposed a simple rule. To be enforceable, a consent decree
must either (1) be justifiable as a judicial remedy in the case; or (2)
be within the authority of the government signatory, wholly apart
from the decree. Adherence to this standard will not inhibit good
faith settlements of litigation against the government, but will pre-
serve the constitutional discretion of the elected President.
in absent the contract, probably with monetary compensation measured in much the way
compensation for terminations for convenience of procurement contracts is measured. See
text at notes 45-49.
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